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Original Habitation
Pregnant Flesh as Absolute Hospitality
F R A N C E S G R AY
In this essay I develop a meta phor that evokes the idea of woman’s preg-
nant fl esh as the original home and ground of human sociality. I explicate 
notions of fl esh, of home, and of hospitality elaborated by Maurice 
Merleau- Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida and argue that 
these notions assume the temporal and existential priority of pregnant 
being. Underpinning my analysis is Edmund Husserl’s claim that the con-
scious body, as personal individual, presupposes “a plurality of subjects in 
mutual intersubjective understanding.” Th is decidedly Hegelian senti-
ment expresses the intuition that human selfhood requires human other-
ness. Th e existence of a “plurality of subjects in mutual intersubjective 
understanding” has a temporal and an existential priority over the per-
sonal. We are all born into worlds that already exist, and that will continue 
to exist once we die. We all come into being through our intertwining with 
those pluralities, which, in all of their manifestations, are the symbolic 
matrices with which we must contend as we grow into human being. In 
other words, the existential and temporal preconditions of our personal 
existences that help to bring us into human personhood, that help to or-
chestrate our subjectivities are, in essence, predicated on the plurality implicit 
in mutual intersubjective understanding.
I argue that the fundamental intrinsic relatedness of all human life ex-
pressed in the relationship between the pregnant woman and her “second 
subject” is the precondition for this plurality of subjects, for intersubjective 
possibilities within the already given, what has to be presupposed. Note 
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that this relationship between pregnant fl esh and her “second subject” is 
not itself an instance of “plurality of subjects in mutual intersubjective 
understanding,” but merely a condition of its possibility. Th e stress is on 
preconditionality: in a very basic sense, the “twoness” on which Luce Iriga-
ray insists as a principle of individuation is exemplifi ed in the pregnant 
fl esh meta phor.
I take the second subject to be a subject other than, but simultaneously 
the same as, the woman’s fl esh, a subject who inhabits her body, a separate 
consciousness created in, and as a result of her bodily environment. I main-
tain that pregnant woman is not just body, but living body, living experi-
ence. Hence I adopt Merleau- Ponty’s term “fl esh,” which “is not matter, is 
not mind, is not substance” but is “midway between the spatio- temporal 
individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings style of being 
wherever there is a fragment of being. Th e fl esh in this sense is an ‘element.’ ” 
If fl esh is an incarnate principle that brings style of being, then, I argue, 
pregnancy, pregnant fl esh, is a specifi c style of being with a unique style of 
relationship. In my view, pregnant fl esh anticipates the possibility of all 
mutual intersubjective understanding, as an elemental communion evolves 
between a pregnant subject and the potential subject cohabiting in one fl esh: 
the singularity of the woman’s fl esh is transformed through the growth of 
another fl esh, an immature other with its genesis in her fl esh, her semblé.
I then argue that Jacques Derrida’s claim that unconditional or absolute 
hospitality is impossible does not take account of pregnant fl esh as an 
originary ground of being. Th e pregnant woman as host participates in a 
hospitality that potentially models a temporary abandonment of her self in 
pursuit of the interests of a dependent, immature being. Pregnancy can be 
seen as the original host- guest relationship: it is ethically primitive. Its ethical 
primitiveness consists not in the fact that a host off ers hospitality to a pre-
existing guest. Rather, pregnancy is an actualizing of being, an enabling of 
life that has not previously existed. In that sense, pregnancy does not follow 
the Derridean model of hospitality as gift.
Last, I consider the implications of my argument in relation to two con-
tentious issues in moral philosophy: unwanted pregnancy and the abortion 
debate. I focus in par tic u lar on Judith Jarvis Th omson’s article “A Defense 
of Abortion,” in which she raises the idea of woman as  house. Th e claims 
I make in this essay, I argue, can be seen as an elaboration of Th omson’s 
idea, and they illuminate the notion of a woman’s right to decide what 
happens to her own body. From a phenomenological perspective, some 
host- guest relationships in pregnancy need to be seen as a corruption of 
original hospitality, as when a pregnant woman neither desires to become 
pregnant nor, once pregnant, decides to remain so. Th e question of rights 
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of the pregnant woman and the right to life in the being in the uterus are 
predicated on this primary, albeit meta phorical, relationship of host and 
guest. I consider Caroline Lundquist’s arguments regarding rejected and 
denied pregnancies as a possible counter to my claim about original hospi-
tality. Th ere, the full importance of the status of the meta phor comes into 
play.
But what is the status of the meta phor of the body as original habitation? 
Th e human body has a “life- will” or body intentionality of its own, regard-
less of what we think, how we construct the body, and how we would like 
the body to be. Essentially, absolute hospitality is an expression of the 
body’s life- will or intentionality. Pregnant fl esh’s subjective will and its 
relationship to its own pregnancy are predicated on the fundamental life- 
will of the body. Ultimately, the body as a living entity that is a product of 
evolution and the elements, the material being that we all are, will triumph 
over any of our eff orts, demands, and wishes, taking us to our ensured 
demises in old age, withering, and death. Certainly, we can mold the body: 
we can exercise, diet, use biotechnologies, surgical procedures, and drugs 
to transform our bodies. Th is attempt to construct the body— to disci-
pline, to make its heart beat faster, its muscles bigger, its frame thinner, its 
joints more fl exible, to respond to injury, to impregnate— relies already on 
its essential materiality. And that is the ground of the meta phor of original 
habitation. Th e status of this meta phor is derivative of a preestablished bio-
logical harmony (to borrow from Leibniz) of anatomy and physiology, of 
function, ends (telos) and limits that are fi xed, and boundaries that can be 
overcome. Th is meta phor is a biometa phor, a meta phor of life and living- 
being, that permits us to perceive the body as original habitation, but 
which does not preclude the possibility of the body’s own conscious refl ec-
tion on itself, at times bounded by its own subjective will. Th rough that 
refl ection and the structures of language, the body is able to construct and 
picture itself, represent itself to itself, “do” and “make” the aforementioned 
constructions.
How we experience the body, particularly our own bodies, is an eff ect of 
both the very materiality we bodies are, together with the kind of conscious-
ness that permeates human being. Th e originary body, this amazing bio-
consciousness, is the complex out of which moral considerations arise with 
respect to our bodies themselves, as discreet yet community- bound fl esh, to 
bring us to our situatedness in the world. To that extent, the originary body 
needs to be acknowledged as itself the ground of fl esh and morality.
Th e meta phor of original habitation has two subjective aspects: our own 
lived experience, and the origin of that experience in the pregnant fl esh. 
Considered as a preestablished biological harmony, the human body is 
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value- neutral—it does what it does irrespective of our moral perturbations 
and ruminations. Th us I maintain that the material body as the origin of 
consciousness and fl esh, is the logical precondition of personhood: the 
material body is, in this sense, preconscious, prefl esh, prepersonal, and pre-
discursive; but is the ontological condition of the value laden- ness we fi nd 
in theorizing of the body such as Michel Foucault’s and Judith Butler’s 
accounts of the body. In other words, epistemology is grounded in ontology 
of the body, the expression of which is bound to value systems. Pregnancy, 
abortion, and unwanted pregnancy will need, then, to be seen within this 
biometa phorical framework, as a response in other words, to the “life- will” 
of the body. Th e meta phor of original habitation belongs in fl esh, as I shall 
shortly argue, but it is the materiality of the body that enables originary 
fl esh, a materiality that is both “inside” and “outside” consciousness.
Subjective Ground
To begin, I comment on two points from Julia Kristeva’s “Motherhood 
According to Bellini.” Its opening lines are:
Cells fuse, split, and proliferate; volumes grow, tissues stretch, and 
body fl uids change rhythm, speeding up or slowing down. Within the 
body, growing as a graft, indomitable, there is another. And no- one 
is present, within that simultaneously dual and alien space, to signify 
what is going on. “It happens, but I’m not there.” “I cannot realize it, 
but it goes on.” Motherhood’s impossible syllogism.
Th is becoming- a-mother, this gestation, can possibly be accounted 
for by means of only two discourses. Th ere is science. . . .  Th ere is 
Christian theology.
Kristeva later argues that the Orthodox Catholic Church has given to 
Western Christianity its “practice of honoring Christ’s mother, his Nativity 
and her ‘Dormition,’ ” which was a consequence of the Orthodox “annexing 
the Oriental rites of mother- goddess and fecundity.”  My essay deals with 
neither science nor Christian theology. Furthermore, it is not embedded in 
empirical investigation, but is, rather, an interpretation of the symbolic 
pre ce dence of pregnancy and the prematernal body. In this light Kristeva’s 
reference to Orthodox refi guring of Oriental rites of mother- goddess and 
fecundity lead her to speak of conceptions of the Virgin (Mother) as ergas-
terion—privileged space, living area, ladder (of Jacob), or door (of the Tem-
ple, in Ezekiel’s vision)—dwelling, in short. She is thus seen as a  union, a 
contact without gap, without separation, and these functions make her a 
meta phor for the Holy Ghost.
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Kristeva’s reading of Common Testament allusions to Mary as the em-
bodiment of ontological place, with the further allusion to Mary as meta-
phor ical ly the Holy Ghost or the love between Father and Son, implies a 
theo- cultural idealization of the pregnant woman and the mother as a 
location or site. Th e idea of Mary as mediatrix between Father and Son, by 
virtue of her maternity, is exaggerated in her Virgin Mother status. Th e 
theological issues that arise from this reading are not my concern  here, and 
the notion of mediatrix is tangential to the issues of this essay, so I leave this 
for now. What is pertinent is that the notion of the Virgin as woman, as 
mother, as place, and as dwelling are precisely the symbolic tropes that can 
be extrapolated to all pregnant women. Th e gift of Mary’s body to an un-
known other, theologically speaking, the Origin of Origins, in the forma-
tion of the primeval guest– host relationship, underscores the special status 
of the fl esh. Yet Mary’s consent is crucial to the event that will follow.
Specialness of the fl esh is the focus of Merleau- Ponty’s use of the term. 
Neither one category of being nor another, neither body nor mind this is a 
new category that captures what it is to be human. Mary, in this story, is a 
kind of symbolic cultural ideal. Symbolically, the Mary and Jesus story tells 
us what it means to be human and that to be human is to be a product of 
unconditional hospitality. Indeed such images perhaps precede and inform 
the theological account, a view endorsed by the following considerations.
Kristeva’s claim that there is either the scientifi c or Christian theological 
account for becoming- a-mother and gestation echoes similar divisions of 
discourse kinds found in the work of, for example, Husserl. In one sense, 
it can be seen as a limitation on discourses available for such accounting; 
in another, it is useful as a conceptualization of the dualistic thinking that 
has been identifi ed in recent scholarship as counterproductive evaluations 
of the way the world is. Much better, the argument would go, to recognize 
and acknowledge the interdependencies and reciprocities involved in the way 
the world is, and to use discourses that express this relation. Such is the case 
from Hegel to Husserl, to de Beauvoir, to Merleau- Ponty and beyond. In 
the thinking of the phenomenologists Husserl and Merleau- Ponty, empha-
sis is placed on the body in the world from the beginning. Th ere is no point 
of insertion, no choice to be made: the body as body emerges from, and is 
permeated by, the world. On this account, the dualistic structures of think-
ing that divide, separate, and impose are seen as inauthentic strategies of 
power imposition and maintenance.
Th e integrity of the body needs, then, to be seen in terms of its relations 
in and with the world. If we look at Husserl’s account of the conscious 
body in the world, we see an attempt to deal with the universal structures 
that are manifested in those relationships and contingencies, as well as the 
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body’s situatedness in the world. Meaning arises through one’s refl ective 
capacity, and its activity, that is expressed in the cogito. Th e pregnant body 
is no exception to such an envisaging: Th e question of meaning and the 
language one uses with all of its ontological commitments in making that 
meaning are pertinent to all states and conditions of the living and lived 
body. Meaning has to do with centrality of the cogito, but the cogito is not 
a disembodied aspect of being except insofar as it operates in a specifi c in-
tentional manner. Th at manner, which Husserl holds is prior to the natural 
world in which we fi nd ourselves, he articulates as the act of identifying 
the pure ego.
Th is is what Husserl says:
Th e world is for me absolutely nothing  else but the world existing for 
and accepted by me in such a conscious cogito. It gets its  whole sense, 
universal and specifi c, and its ac cep tance as existing, exclusively from 
such cogitationes. In these my  whole life- world goes on, including my 
scientifi cally inquiring and grounding life. By my living, by my ex-
periencing, thinking, valuing and acting, I can enter no world other 
than the one that gets its sense and ac cep tance or status [Sinn und 
Geltung] in and from me, myself.
Husserl goes on to argue that once one puts oneself above this life and 
no longer takes the world as it is given (in the natural attitude), then “I 
thereby acquire myself as the pure ego, with the pure stream of my cogita-
tions.” Husserl’s construction of the transcendental ego through the 
method that is the phenomenological epoché is not something I intend to 
defend  here. I think, though, that one cannot speak about the living and 
lived body, and the ego’s formation of concepts on which it acts in the 
world, without mentioning the debt owed to him by later phenomenolo-
gists. His idea that the body is living and in a life- world has deep implica-
tions for the pregnant body that is the source of the living body, above all 
because meaning and symbol are articulated as a consequence of the activ-
ity of the cogito. Th e body in the world is a par tic u lar kind of fl eshy being 
among other fl eshy beings, with its interactions and reciprocities, its re-
markable capacity to learn through imitation, to create and to refl ect, to 
reproduce, and the body owes its being and its coming into the world as 
fl esh already to another, to pregnant fl esh.
So let us ask the question, “What makes possible and forever symbolizes 
the pregnant body as original home?” And if we use Merleau- Ponty’s notion 
of fl esh, how does this help to fi gure the uniqueness of the relationship 
between the pregnant body as host, and the embryo/fetus as guest?
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Th e Body as Flesh; and Flesh as Ground of Being
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau- Ponty argues, “My personal exis-
tence must be the resumption of a prepersonal tradition. Th ere is, there-
fore, another subject beneath me, for whom a world exists before I am  here, 
and who marks my place in it. Th is captive or natural spirit is my body, 
not that momentary body which is the instrument of my personal choices 
and which fastens upon this or that world, but the systems of anonymous 
‘functions’ which draw every par tic u lar focus into a general project.” 
What are we to make of the concept of a resumption of prepersonal tradi-
tion? While Merleau- Ponty identifi es his body as the subject underlying 
this prepersonal tradition, it is his body as a fact of being, a continuous and 
continuing being to his existence, his lived and living body in spite of 
himself, to which he is referring. Yet his argument seems to be suggesting 
that his body and the systems of anonymous functions constituting that 
body are replicated in all bodies: He is a member of a group with biological 
and various sociocultural histories. So his par tic u lar body is a resumption 
insofar as it is one body among a continuous history of conscious body, a 
history of human being, situated before during and after the existence of 
his specifi c body. Th e body in the world is a body of and by the world, a body 
among other similar bodies and anonymous systems that come to see and rec-
ognize each other.
Th e notion of “prepersonal tradition” is not unambiguous, though. 
It can be extrapolated to a number of diff erent occasions, above all, as 
Merleau- Ponty insists, because there must be a resumption of that tradi-
tion. I argue that this tradition is not merely the fact of the body and its 
being in the world, not merely systems of anonymous “functions” but a 
tradition of pregnant embodiment, of pregnant fl esh as original home, 
framed, ideally by consent and ac cep tance, welcoming and anticipation. 
Th e ideality of this framing can be countered, as we shall later see, by the 
recognition that the provision of original home is an unacceptable choice 
for many women. Th at said, it remains the case that prepersonal tradition 
is always predicated on pregnant body; pregnant body is the means of our 
entry into the prepersonal tradition.
As such, any individual body is a replication of other, similar bodies 
intertwined with each other, and simultaneously directly and indirectly 
connected with my body, as human body, as Merleau- Ponty would surely 
acknowledge. Community, ethical relation, biology, and genealogy are 
 aspects of those connections. However, replication through the contribu-
tory agency of a biological father and, after implantation, in woman’s 
body, suggests that there is a “subject beneath” that is not voiced by 
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Merleau- Ponty. It is not simply woman’s body that is pregnant. Woman is 
a subject, a she who is pregnant fl esh bearing fl esh. She is fl esh by virtue of 
the kind of being she is. We see that for Merleau- Ponty, “fl esh” is neither 
animated body nor embodied mind, or spirit or soul. “Flesh” is a third 
category of being that echoes not only Descartes’s  union of the intermin-
gling mind and body in Meditation VI, but also his subsequent emphasis 
on sensation in Meditation VI. “Flesh” is both sensible and sentient, a 
multidimensional mass of living being that situates us in the world and the 
world in us. In my view, the fl esh that is woman, and the woman who is 
fl esh is a condition of the resumption of the prepersonal tradition, a tradi-
tion predicated not only on “body” and its situation in a world, but also 
on the very being of feminine, pregnant fl esh.
Let us follow this thinking through. In “Th e Intertwining— Th e Chiasm,” 
Merleau- Ponty uses the term “fl esh” or “carnal being” to accentuate the 
importance of the body as “sensible mass” and mass as the “sensible body” 
in excess of its mere materiality. Merleau- Ponty highlights the two dimen-
sionality of the subject qua subject and object, in its living carnality.
It is the body and it alone, because it is a two- dimensional being, that 
can bring us to the things themselves, which are themselves not fl at 
beings but beings in depth, inaccessible to a subject that would sur-
vey them from above, open to him alone that, if it be possible, would 
coexist with them in the same world. When we speak of the fl esh of the 
visible . . .  we mean that carnal being, as a being of depths, of several 
layers or several faces, a being in latency, and a pre sen ta tion of a cer-
tain absence, is a prototype of Being, of which our body, the sensible 
sentient, is a very remarkable variant.
Th ese two aspects of the fl esh lend themselves readily to the corruption 
of the complex ethics of the fl esh that is symbolized in the pregnant body. 
Th e pregnant body, sensible and sentient, is pregnant fl esh who is subject 
and that, by virtue of her visibility in the world as a pregnant human being, 
becomes an object of a specifi c kind of specularization. Th e doubling of 
the fl esh as both subject and object, the sensible sentient, what sees and 
is seen, touches and is touched, is the natural (and by “natural” I mean 
“fi rst”) state of all humans. Yet in the pregnant fl esh, that natural state 
takes on a new dimension, situated as it is in the pro cess of reproduction 
not only of the species as body, but species as new fl esh. Inhabitation of 
pregnant fl esh by body already rendered fl esh because of its origins has the 
transformative eff ect of converting the being of the woman from potential 
place to actual place. Th us her subject/object singularity is temporarily 
suspended in two ways: her singular fl esh now becomes two fl eshes in one 
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place; and her singular fl esh is now symbolically the fl esh of all humans, 
in its plurality and multiplicity, symbolically, that is, the being of all fl esh.
Th e importance of this fact is not lost to Emmanuel Levinas, whose focus 
on woman and the feminine, and their centrality to hospitality, fundamen-
tally reinforces masculine paternal interpretations of motherhood and, by 
extension, its enabling state. Th e family, the interior of sociocultural rela-
tions, seen in the parental home, has had, as a matter of fact, woman at its 
center, and Levinas recognizes this. He argues that the home is privileged 
because it is the condition or ground of all human activity, “and in this 
sense, its commencement.” As such, it is foundational for all sociality. 
What, in the very fi rst instance, makes the home possible are the familiar-
ity and intimacy “that are produced as a gentleness that spreads over the 
face of things.” In this gentleness, he argues, “I” is constituted, but only in 
response “from an aff ection [amitié] for that I. Th e intimacy which famil-
iarity presupposes is an intimacy with someone.” For Levinas, that someone 
is woman, who is, likewise, “the condition for recollection, the interiority 
of the Home, and habitation.” Hence woman instigates the inaugural con-
ditions of hospitality through becoming the intimacy so central to dwell-
ing, so central to one’s being in the world. Th e initial relationship is with 
feminine alterity, a presence prior to, and on which, all transcendence is 
predicated. “Th e woman is the condition for recollection, the interiority of 
the Home, and inhabitation.” Home is the original siting of one’s self, the 
formative environment in which feminine alterity is presupposed by the 
transcendence that is language: Language comes after one experiences 
woman and the feminine. In this sense, woman is the prelinguistic domain 
of intimate being. Habitation, dwelling, familiarity, intimacy, gentleness, 
interiority, and recollection are interwoven, with woman constituting the 
matrix that makes possible the complexity of the relationships that emerge.
Levinas’s idea that the “intimacy which familiarity presupposes is an 
intimacy with someone” has its origins, I argue, in the primary situation 
that is pregnancy, a phase that precedes the later mother/child relationship 
that he seems to have in mind. Pregnancy is a situation, a place of unique 
relationship and identifi cation. Hence the relationship between the fl esh 
that is pregnant host and the fl esh that is embryonic guest, an intimacy of 
fl esh with fl esh is, a diff erent, and uniquely intimate relationship. Merleau- 
Ponty’s fl esh as “an incarnate principle that brings style of being where 
there is a fragment of being” is pertinent  here. Th e diff erence and unique-
ness of the relationship between pregnant host and embryonic guest con-
sists in its style of being where, from the fi rst, fragment of being is ex-
pressed. Until recently, our fragment of being began, unambiguously, as 
fl esh within fl esh, as the original life situation and pro cess. So let us be 
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cognizant of the fact that pregnant fl esh is pregnant fl esh by virtue of its 
transformed state via the intimate presence of an other who is just like 
herself (semblé), but above all, by virtue of the unique, prematernal rela-
tionship that exists between the two. Th is two, yet one, is the ground of 
maternity, but not maternity per se. And it is the ground of absolute hos-
pitality, a symbolic expression of moral possibility, of moral aspiration. But 
I do not say this without qualifi cation, as we shall shortly see.
Levinas had already argued that the Face of the Other (Visage d’Autrui) 
is the absolute ground of ethics when Jacques Derrida distinguished be-
tween conditional and unconditional hospitality. Indeed Derrida’s analysis 
is dependent on the ethics of the Face, the conceptualization of ethics 
as unqualifi ed regard for the Other as well as the Maussian contention that 
a gift is never free, that it always demands a return. Derrida argues that the 
history of hospitability in the West is a history of conditionality, or hospi-
tality framed always by laws, “those rights and duties that are always con-
ditioned and conditional.” In contrast, absolute hospitality, says Derrida, 
is unconditionally given as a welcome to one’s home.
Absolute hospitality requires that I open my home and that I give not 
only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social 
status of being a foreigner,  etc.), but to the absolute unknown, anon-
ymous other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that 
I let them arrive, and take place in the place I off er them, without 
asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their 
names. Th e law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hos-
pitality by right, with law or justice as rights. Just hospitality breaks 
with hospitality by right; not that it condemns or is opposed to it, and 
it can on the contrary set and maintain it in a perpetual progressive 
movement; but it is as strangely heterogeneous to the law to which it 
is yet so close, from which in truth it is indissociable.
Derrida notes that there is reciprocity between these “two régimes of 
a law of hospitality” so that they are indispensable to each other. While 
absolute hospitality is transcendent to laws and justice, absolute hospitality 
is itself universal law as ethic, an ethic concerned with the stranger or 
foreigner. Derrida’s exposition of hôte, symbolically framed by Pierre Klos-
sowski’s Roberte ce soir, calls on the (handwritten) Laws of Hospitality 
placed by the narrator’s uncle above the guest’s bed “and under glass,” 
above the bed as if to suggest the transcendence of the law. Yet the laws of 
hospitality, “those rights and duties that are always conditioned and con-
ditional” and which we can trace through from the Greco- Roman tradi-
tion to Kant and Hegel, the family and the State, confl ict with or form an 
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aporia, an antinomy with, the law of hospitality, unlimited as it is by status, 
or condition “without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfi llment 
of even the smallest condition.” Th e law, argues Derrida, is above the 
laws, nomos anomos; however, it is dependent for concretization on the very 
laws that “deny it, or at any rate threaten it, sometimes corrupt and pervert 
it. And must always be able to do this.”
Derrida’s claim that hospitality is always conditional is tied to his simul-
taneous insistence on unconditionality as an ideal of hospitality. “Respon-
sibility” underlies the relations that are constitutive of hospitality: one is 
responsible to another. But Derrida also argues that the guest is eagerly 
awaited by the host, that there is an entering
“without waiting” a “come inside,” “come with me” not only toward 
me, but within me: occupy me, take place in me, which means by 
the same token, also take my place, don’t content yourself with com-
ing to meet me or “into my home.” Crossing the threshold is entering 
and not only approaching or coming. Strange logic, but so enlighten-
ing for us, that of an impatient master awaiting his guest as a libera-
tor, his emancipator.
In Adieu Derrida asks, “Is not hospitality an interruption of the self ?”— 
the question that he appears to be elaborating in his description of the 
eagerness of the host in anticipating the guest’s arrival. “ ‘Occupy me,’ ‘take 
place in me,’ can be seen as the unspoken corollary of absolute hospitality: 
I give myself to you,” and as, Derrida suggests,
It’s as if the stranger or foreigner held the keys . . .  as if, then the 
stranger could save the master and liberate the power of his host; it’s 
as if the master qua master,  were prisoner of his place and his power, 
of his ipseity, of his subjectivity (his subjectivity is hostage . . .  the one 
who invites, the inviting host, who becomes the hostage— and who 
really always has been . . .  Th e guest (hôte) becomes the host (hôte) of 
the host (hôte).
Clearly, Derrida is proposing what might be seen as an unattainable 
ideal: the giving over of oneself in the manner he describes implies an 
abandonment of self, a selfl essness out of step with how many of us see and 
live our lives. Intrinsic to the idea of the transformative moment that sees 
guest and host transposed is complete trust and the consent of the host. 
Th at pregnancy fi ts neatly into this schematizing is moot, yet there is some-
thing compelling about Derrida’s descriptive ideal that does not seem mis-
placed in relation to pregnant fl esh. For example, one might ask, “Is the 
transposition of guest and host enacted in pregnancy, and if so, to what 
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degree?” Is such a transposition a moral requirement of pregnancy? And 
what of the possibility of bad guest, the guest who is does not express grati-
tude, (for this would be an inappropriate exchange that would erase the 
true giftness of hospitality), who is not trustworthy, and who cannot be 
countenanced in this ideal frame?
Insofar as the context of responsibility prevails (Dostoyevsky: “All men 
are responsible for one another and I more than anyone  else”) as reiterated 
by Levinas and endorsed by Derrida, it is diffi  cult to reconcile the notions 
of responsibility and reciprocity in relation to pregnancy. We might wonder 
what it is that constitutes the boundaries between a you as Autrui and an 
I. While I am responsible, you, also, as the I that you are, are equally re-
sponsible. Yet Levinas’s insistence on the asymmetry of the ethical rela-
tionship in one’s responsibility for the Other overlooks the network of 
responsibilities that point toward not a personal, ego ideal, but toward a 
collective ideal of mutual and symmetrical moral reciprocity. Th is is what 
we fi nd in Derrida’s elucidation of the guest– host relationship and its con-
fl ation and transformation.
Yet, as we have seen, Derrida’s description of the elision between guest 
and host takes no account of pregnant fl esh, where a merging of fl esh 
unique to pregnancy is enacted. His description of the host and guest re-
lationship assumes a radical otherness that is not, and yet is, witnessed in 
pregnant fl esh. Th is is the paradox of pregnancy. Th e unique relation of 
fl esh within fl esh in living individuality yet asymmetric de pen den cy, con-
tains both radical otherness and radical oneness. Core to this claim is the 
idea that pregnant fl esh is symbolically the site par excellence of absolute 
hospitality that is expressed in elements of Derrida’s spatial terminology: 
“ ‘come inside,’ ‘come with me’ not only toward me, but within me: occupy 
me, take place in me, which means by the same token, also take my place, 
don’t content yourself with coming to meet me or ‘into my home,’ ” and in 
his notion of the absolute, unknown other. Th e doubling of fl esh both 
delimits and embodies the suspension of subjectivity: woman as pregnant 
fl esh is two subjects, yet one subject. Th e blurring of boundaries of fl esh 
with fl esh, the doubling of fl esh as both subject and object that we fi nd in 
the pregnant fl esh is the condition of Derrida’s transposition of guest with 
host and host with guest, yet is impossible in its own fulfi llment. Host is 
one with guest, yet host and guest can never be one. In this view, pregnant 
fl esh as original hospitality precedes and models the po liti cal or social 
function or pro cess that we see in his account of absolute hospitality: preg-
nant fl esh is the model, prototype (and archetype) of hospitality: the original 
relationship(s) expressed in pregnant fl esh are the primitive hospitality of 
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intersubjective oneness and, simultaneously, twoness. Th e language of blur-
ring of boundaries, elision, transposition of the place of guest and host, is 
seen fi rst in pregnancy: hospitality as a social function of the human world 
is secondary to the relationships we fi nd embodied in pregnant fl esh. Th ese 
notions, however, turn on the important distinction between body- will and 
subjective will, on that is, the subtlety of the biometa phor I introduced in 
the beginning of this essay.
Th e pregnant fl esh expresses a meta phorical idealization of absolute hos-
pitality, articulated in terms of life- will of the body. Given the primitive 
nature of pregnancy as hospitality, we need to rethink the Derridean ac-
count, especially as he articulates hospitality in terms of the gift. In my 
view, pregnant fl esh does not give a gift either being, or birth, to her semblé. 
Giftness presupposes both giver and receiver, just as guest and host presup-
pose each other, but the presuppositions  here are unrelated. Female fl esh 
is the occasion of a potential hospitality, which is actualized only with 
impregnation. Th at pregnant fl esh accedes to its own telos with respect to her 
semblé and prepares the ground for a potential guest– host situation. But 
this is not a given. Pregnant fl esh as original hospitality is expressed always 
already in the rise of primary inter- subjectivity, regardless of Derridean 
guest– host considerations. What throws a spanner in the works, however, 
are questions around unwanted pregnancy and abortion, my last concern 
in this essay.
Abortion and Unwanted Pregnancy
In “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Th omson examines what she 
terms “the extreme view” that abortion is never permissible, even to save the 
life of the mother, and argues that abortion is permissible under some cir-
cumstances. She accepts for the purposes of her argument that the being 
in the uterus is a person from conception. As such, it has a right to life, since, 
as she also accepts, all persons have a right to life. She then explores how 
the notion of right to life is played out in the abortion debate, and in the 
pro cess analyses competing rights claims that might be made against 
the right to life. She uses several thought experiments in constructing 
some illuminating analogies that are seen to represent a woman’s pregnant 
state. As part of her argument, and in disrupting the reliance on third- 
person arguments of what a pregnant woman can and cannot do in rela-
tion to her own pregnant state, Th omson introduces the domestic space, a 
tiny  house, which you are asked to imagine yourself occupying with a very 
fast growing child. Th e  house is so tiny and the child growing so fast that if 
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you do not do something soon, you will be crushed to death. Th omson ar-
gues that it is permissible in these circumstances for you to defend yourself 
against the child rather than “to wait passively while it crushes you to 
death.”  Th at will mean, of course, that you will have to kill the child.
Th omson comments, “Perhaps a woman is vaguely felt to have the status 
of  house to which we don’t allow the right of self- defense. But if the woman 
 houses the child, it should be remembered that she is a person who  houses 
it.” She adds that the pregnant woman and the being in the uterus are not 
like “two tenants in a small  house which has, by an unfortunate mistake 
been rented out to both: the mother owns the  house.” While Th omson is 
using this par tic u lar example to throw more light on why what a pregnant 
woman can and cannot do is deduced from third- party decision making 
and choice, the notion of woman as own er of her body that is fi gured as 
 house emerges as an important, and very telling, trope. Th e language of 
her argument is not only the language of the corporeal but also of the 
domestic residence. She brings together, in other words, the clear notion 
that a pregnant woman, or in my terminology, pregnant fl esh, is host to 
the being in the uterus, and as such, has a right to decide the appropriate-
ness of some tenancies.
One implication of my argument is that pregnant fl esh as original and 
primitive hospitality is a further elaboration of the extreme view. But as 
I shall show, this implication does not follow. Very clearly, my argument 
supposes that pregnant fl esh embodies a relationship between a subject and 
a potential subject who are simultaneously material bodies, fl esh. It is moot 
that this relationship is between two persons. For the purposes of this es-
say, I leave that question aside. What I would like to stress is that the 
subjectivity of woman as pregnant fl esh requires that recognition be given 
to the circumstances in which she fi nds herself. Even though pregnant 
fl esh as originating body is meta phor ical ly, and ideally, the site of original 
and absolute hospitality, it is not incumbent on every woman to either 
exhibit or to maintain absolute hospitality in every circumstance. Hospi-
tality, as an act of subjective generosity, is desirable but not obligatory. 
While there might be biological imperatives for there to be some acts of 
absolute hospitality, at the moment, it is not clear that such acts and the 
state that results from them, will always be. Technology may become such 
that humans are all produced in vitro or by some other means.
Second, the relationship expressed in the notion of original hospitality 
can be corrupted, as it is, I suggest in pregnancy resulting from rape, itself 
already an invasion of the fl esh.  Were my  house to be broken into and a 
being who would destroy my life as I understand it, and which I did not 
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want, left behind, I am not obliged to maintain its existence by letting it 
remain in my  house. Furthermore, where a woman fi nds herself acciden-
tally pregnant, it is a corruption of original habitation, original hospitality, 
to require the continuance of an unwanted state. To invoke a meta phor 
that will come into play shortly: I may decide that sparrows nesting in my 
roof must go: they wake me early, make a mess everywhere, and are taking 
over the place: they have to go. I do not have to be a Good Samaritan to 
them. Th omson’s view that in the United States “woman are compelled by 
law to be not merely Minimally Decent Samaritans but Good Samaritans 
to unborn persons inside them”  is pertinent  here. Th e answer to the ques-
tion, “Can a woman be compelled to be the site of absolute hospitality?” is 
“No.” To compel someone to do that which is characterized by the giving 
of herself in Derrida’s terms of the “come inside, occupy my place” is to 
abandon the ethically primitive nature of the relationship that ensues. It is 
important then, to read absolute hospitality, as not a mere biological state 
or pro cess, but as a meta phor for conscious, living, pregnant fl esh.
Note that in my view, a pregnant woman qua pregnant woman is not 
yet mother to this specifi c life in her uterus. Indeed, the notion of a pre-
maternal intimacy, an intimacy constructed around intrauterine life and 
the pregnant fl esh, can be seen as a way to problematize the notions of a 
prebirth guarantee of the acceptability of the guest, sought in ge ne tic selec-
tion and of rights seen so often in abortion debates. Julia Hanigsberg has 
argued that the abortion debate is fueled by the assumption that once 
pregnant, woman is already mother to the life in her uterus. I follow her 
in rejecting this conceptualizing of pregnancy. Pregnant fl esh is bracketed 
from the responsibility of the maternal, even as it gives rise to the maternal. 
Maternal ethics arise in relation not to pregnancy, but as a result of birth 
that proceeds from pregnancy. Relationship with the newly born Other 
postbirth actualizes the potential that exists in prematernal intimacy. Th is 
does not mean that there is no ethics attached to pregnant fl esh: rather, 
in the case of pregnant fl esh, stress needs to be placed on the prematernal, 
on the intimacy that is possible for pregnant fl esh. Th at such intimacy is 
possible does not carry with it a moral obligation for actualization of that 
possibility. Indeed, elaborations of maternal ethics that begin in pregnant 
fl esh suggest the erasure of a boundary that is important to women’s 
self- determination.
In her analysis of the maternal body, Lisa Guenther remarks that the 
“maternal body welcomes an Other whom she did not make or cause; she 
bears this other who remains a stranger despite her bearing, unseen and 
perhaps even violent: kicking at her ribs, altering the shape of her body, 
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shifting her bones from within. She bears the pain of the Other for the sake 
of the Other; in this bearing, she becomes responsible for the child, for the 
child’s responsibility, and even for the pain the child infl icts.”  I think 
that Guenther’s analysis is overdetermined by the notion of Levinas’s 
“maternity, which is bearing par excellence, bears even the responsibility for 
the persecuting by the persecutor.”  But I would also question Guenther’s 
claim that the maternal body— as she sees it—“welcomes an Other whom 
she did not make or cause.” How are we to understand this claim? In my 
discussion of the meta phor of original habitation, I argued that the mate-
rial body has its own life- will, that the body is the ontological precondition 
of pregnancy. Given the material nature of pregnancy, one might ask that 
if the maternal body does not make or cause that Other, what does? What 
is this Other if it is not itself a material Other in its fundamental being? 
Furthermore, the burden of responsibility for the Other can arise only 
given the material preconditions of pregnancy.
But Guenther’s analysis also raises an issue about the notion of respon-
sibility in terms of both Levinas’s and Derrida’s interpretation of hospital-
ity and the gift. I do not welcome or regard as guests the sparrows that nest 
in my roof, yet I give hospitality to those sparrows by letting them remain: 
they occupy my home, they are an absolute, unknown Other. I have no 
responsibility toward them, nor they to me. My hospitality arises in light 
of a certain opportunism exhibited by the sparrows. Initially, pregnancy is 
very like the sparrows nesting. However, the analogy ends there. Sparrows 
preexist my hospitality; the fetus does not so preexist. What distinguishes 
the pregnant fl esh as absolute hospitality is its unique coming into being 
that is coterminous with the making of the fetus: It is the primary expres-
sion of abandonment to an unknown Other, who is yet to be.
At the beginning of this essay, I argued that the meta phor of original 
habitation has two aspects: as body- life with its own telos, the origin of 
pregnant fl esh, and as the site of subjective will (and consciousness). I also 
argued that the human body is value- neutral—it does what it does irre-
spective of our moral perturbations and ruminations, and in this we can 
detect a body- life- will or body intentionality. We need now to note that at 
times subjective- will can override the intentionality of the body. Such is 
the case with abortion. In other words, body- will and subjective- will do 
not always match, nor should they: only would the extreme anthropocen-
trist insist on such unremitting consistency. While the body might express 
its life- will in de pen dently of one’s subjective- will, the limits of body life- 
will escape the control of subjective- will: the body may spontaneously 
abort in early pregnancy or go into early labor. Th e value- neutrality of the 
body and the value- ladenness of the subjective- will clash in the unwanted 
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pregnancy and abortion debates. Th us, as I see it, there are, from a body- will 
perspective, no grounds to compromise the subjective will of a pregnant 
women: her integrity must be honored and preserved: the phenomenon of 
pregnant fl esh must fi nd itself open to the contingencies of women’s inten-
tions, of women’s vision of their own being.
